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SUBJECTSi 
A CONSIDERATION OF THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE AND KANT* 
Jim K. Swindler 
My purpose is to explore a few interconnected as-
pects of five chief problems in moral theoryt the nature 
of moral agents, whether there can be a universal and 
necessary moral principle, the need for metaphysical 
freedom in ethics, moral freedom proper, and the end of 
morality. The discussion turns around the necessary 
conditions for explanations of moral behavior. Through-
out I take as my strongest adversary the moral theory of 
Kant and as my chief council the ethics of Aristotle, 
though I have not hesitated to depart from the latter 
where it seemed appropriate. The structure of the essay 
is therefore openly polemical. 
I understand ethics to be the science of right and 
wrong interaction among subjects. Since it is a science 
ethics does what every science does, viz. explain the 
behavior of its subject matter. It is therefore a good 
policy to lay down at the beginning what scientific 
explanations are so that we will know what we seek in 
ethics. The subject matter which ethics explains is the 
behavior of subjects (or, equivalently, the behavior of 
people qua moral agents). Since this is a study in 
ethics and not in logic I will only briefly state, and 
without argument, what I take to be the conditions of 
good explanations generally,** the body of the essay, 
however, lies in a middle ground between logic and ethics 
proper, attempting as it does to contribute to the ground 
work of the science. 
What is understood is in every case a substance. 
Understanding is a direct and immediate relationship with 
substance. Explanation requires understanding and what 
is explained is always what follows from the characteri-
zation of a substance which supports the explanation. 
»Edward S. Robinson Memorial Essay Contest Winner, 
University of Kansas, 1975» 
**These considerations are derived from discussion with 
Prof. Richard Cole and from his paper "Causality and 
Sufficient Reason," Review of Metaphysics. Sept. 197^. 
He is of course not responsible for my errors. 
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This relationship between substance and what is explained 
requires that both be described, otherwise no logical con-
nection between them can be made. Grounds and consequents 
must be characterized, and for the purposes of explanation 
there is no difference between a substance and its charac-
terization, though there must be between a substance and 
its understanding. So we acquire the means for better ex-
planations as we formulate better characterizations, but 
these better characterizations can only follow on better 
understanding of what is characterized! explanation lags 
behind understanding and yet is driven on by it. 
A good explanation is a sound argument in which (a) 
the major premise characterizes a class, the members of 
which are possible substances, (b) a minor further char-
acterizes some of the class members as actual (this is 
usually implicit in (c)), and (c) a second minor charac-
terizes some prior state of the actual substance (this 
gives the middle term and answers the question 'Why(d)?'), 
which is the cause of (d) a posterior state of the sub-
stance which is what wanted explaining. The upper limit 
of good explanation is understanding, in which the formal 
structure collapses into direct immediate apprehension. 
Understanding 5n this sense is beyond evaluation. What 
is not beyond evaluation is knowledge, for knowledge 
depends on explanation. It is possible to understand 
what cannot be known, it must even be necessary, for 
otherwise no knowledge would be possible. It iö expla-
nation in this sense that informs what follows. I assume 
that the reason such explanation is possible in ethics is 
that it is possible to give theoretical reconstructions 
of practical syllogisms. 
A Formal Dematerialization 
1 . 1 . For Kanti "the most important distinction 
which can be considered in practical investigations" is 
between subjective and objective conditions of choice (C, 
27)i* subjective conditions are empirical, objective con-
ditions are rational (C, 39-**°). Because of the contin-
gency of experience (for any particular subject) empirical 
conditions of choice can give only prudential rules, never 
moral laws (C, 37) and can be the basis of only hypotheti-
cal, never of categorical imperatives (F, *tl6). Since 
moral principles raUBt be completely a priori 1 any admix-
ture of empirical information degrades "their worthiness 
*For economy all references are incorporated into the text. 
C = Critique of Practical Reason (Beck tr.), F = Founda-
tions of the Metaphysics of Morals (Beck tr.), M = Meta-
physics of Morals (Ellington tr*). E - Nlchomachean 
EthicB (Ostwald tr.). Page numbers refer to the Akademie 
Ed. of Kant's works and the Bekker Ed, of Aristotle's 
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to serve us as supreme practical principles" (F, Uli). 
Moral education and so moral understanding can in no way 
depend on "observation of oneself" or "the course of the 
world" (M, 216). A good will must be wholly unconditioned 
by any object, "it contains only the form of volition in 
general, arid this form is autonomy" (F, W * ) . Since mo-
rality is the law of all rational beings, rational beings 
must be free from empirical conditions and yet, if they 
are subject to duty, they must be capable of free causal-
ity (F, M7-8) in the natural world. Free choice is the 
only moral choice and it is moral just so far as it is 
free from material determinations! its sole condition must 
be the form of universal lawi "the will whose maxims are 
affected by [sensibility] is not a pure will" (C, 62) and 
is therefore not a moral will. 
But for Kant moral choice has a material component 
nonetheless. The ends whose concepts lie in practical, 
reason (duty), and hence are opposed to ends derived from 
sensible impulses, are the matter of choice and the sub-
ject matter of ethics or the principles of virtue (M, 381)* 
The ends of practical reason are necessary to choice be-
cause without.them "no free action is possible" (M, 339). 
Ethical duties derive from the moral law's commanding the 
maxims of actions but not specific actions, leaving lati-
tude for deliberation over material means (M, 390) which 
must also pass the test of universalizability. The ends 
which are also duties are "one's own perfection and the 
happiness of others" (M. 385). Kant can therefore accom-
odate the concept of a material component of choice, at 
least with respect to ethical duties as opposed to strict 
duties (in which the concept of right directly commands 
specific self-restraints). The highest unconditioned end 
of practical reason is simply virtue, which is therefore 
its own end and its own reward. 
1 . 2 . It is of the utmost importance for Kant's 
ethics that the purity of principles and ends be main-
tained. Nothing empirical can enter into either without 
degrading their moral worth. Moral ends are the material 
of choice in a sense quite different from the sense in 
v/hich moral principles are free of material components 1 
the former are not empirical while the latter are under-
stood by Kant to derive from experience. This is why 
moral ends but not empirical principles can be universal 
and necessary. 
But what is entailed by all this is that Kant has 
driven a wedge between reason and action which may be sui-
cidal for ethics. Kant has eliminated any material (em-
pirical) cause in the moral personality. He grants it a 
final (non-empirical) cause in its end, and a formal cause 
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in the moral law. But he needs to establish its efficient 
causality. Since it has no empirical component, moral per-
sonality cannot be a substance in the sense in which na-
tural objects are substances (this despite the position of 
personality in the table of the categories of freedom (C, 
66)), But it is in the world of natural objects that 
actions occuri it is natural substances that moral per-
sonality must affect. Personality has nothing substantial 
in common with them, which removes the middle term in any 
practical syllogism and renders action miraculous. 
A Kantian might answer that the will serves to medi-
ate between desire and duty (M, 213). But the problem of 
personality as a whole would in that case merely shrink 
(but not disappear) into the will. For the middle term 
is still absent. What is required and what Kant's theory 
cannot provide is a conception of moral agency all of 
whose components contain a common term. If neither moral 
law nor moral ends have empirical components, and if these 
exhaustively describe moral personality, then moral per-
sonality can cause no intelligible empirical action. 
A further point, which may miss its mark in Kant but 
v/hich is instructive, rests on the fact that right and 
wrong are correlative terms. This being 6 0 , it follows 
that they must flow from the same type of substance, i.e. 
subjects. Any adequate characterization of subjects must 
be able to explain both. This in turn requires that sub-
jects have the potential for right and wrong actions. If 
either capacity were absent subjects would be essentially 
different! their characterization would no longer support 
the required explanations. 
1.3 Aristotle, on the other hand, has a theory 
of moral agency which provides most of the materials re-
quired for an adequate link between reason and action. 
The human soul has two constituents, each of which has a 
formal and a material component. There is a rational and 
an irrational part. The irrational part is composed of a 
wholly irrational vegetative element and an appetitive 
element which "partakes of reason in so far as it complies 
with reason and accepts its leadership" (E, 1102b). The 
rational part is divided into its 'scientific' and 'de-
liberative* elements, the former apprehending invariable 
principles, the latter variable principles (E. 1139a). 
Of the four components relevant to action, the vegetative 
is purely material and the scientific is purely formal. 
Desire and deliberation, however, each have material and 
formal elementsi v/hich together are the origin of choice 
which is the efficient cause of action* "eupraxla in human 
conduct is not possible without thought and character... 
thought alone moves nothing...choice is either intelli-
gence motivated by desire or desire operating through 
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thought, and it is as a combination of these two that man 
is a starting point of action" (E, H39a-b). 
It is on the basis of these distinctions that Ari-
stotle talks of moral and intellectual virtues, which are 
the conceptual source of the practical syllogism. The 
empirical element in moral virtues is their source in ha-
bituation! even intellectual virtues are grounded in ex-
perience (E, 1103a), "in a word, characteristics develop 
from corresponding activities" (E, 1103b). Moral habitu-
ation is a matter of coming to feel pleasure at the right 
objects (E, 1104-b). The excellence of the deliberative 
function is practical wisdom, and "practical wisdom has 
as its object the ultimate particular fact, of which there 
is perception but no scientific knowledge" (E, 1142a). It 
is because Aristotle includes material (empirical) grounds 
in the determination of both desire and deliberation that, 
he can account for actionj he has in effect removed the 
wedge that Kant insists on driving between reason and ac-
tion. He has provided the common term in all the condi-
tions and consequences of choice which makes an intelli-
gible conception of moral agency possible. This term is 
in effect substance, a principle of unity which Kant ap-
plies to natural objects but with which he refuses to 
unify moral personality with its natural correlates. This, 
it seems to me, is the Aristotelian answer to both Kant 
and Hume on the matter of the causality of reason. 
A Maximal Dilemma 
Il.li In practical problems, says Kant, what 
is alone important is that there be "some specific de-
termination," without which "the problem cannot be solved" 
(C, 25). For this reason no principle which relies on 
merely contingent (empirical) conditions can serve as a 
practical principle, for every contingent result cannot 
be determined beforehand. Thus, Kant believes that the 
categorical imperative is adequate to solve specific 
practical problems, for it alone among imperatives can 
be stripped of material content (F, 421). So strong is 
his demand for purity here that he claims that the cate-
gorical imperative "must completely determine the will as 
will, even before I ask v/hether I am capable of achieving 
a desired effect or what should be done to realize it" 
(C, 20). 
The categorical imperative, with respect to ethical 
duties, commands maxims but not actions (M, 392)! and its 
first formulation commands the conformity of maxims with 
the idea of universal law (F, 421). This seems the most 
fundamental and Kant's most favored formulation, for from 
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it the others follow. That the concept of law (the cate-
gorical imperative is the practical law) is synonymous 
with the concept of universality makes the judgment "a 
practical law which I acknowledge as such must qualify 
for being universal law...an identical and therefore a 
self-evident proposition" (C, 27). Indeed, the 'type* 
of the moral law is simply the form of natural law IC, 
69), so that the form of the imperative is supposed to 
mediate between it and a proposed maxim. 
"A maxim is the subjective principle of acting which 
contains the practical rule which reason determines accor-
ding to the conditions of the subject (often its ignorance 
or inclination) and is thus the principle according to 
which the subject acts" (F, 421n). A will is described 
but is not determined by its maxims 1 a good will as such 
is one all of whose maxims are universalizable, and is 
therefore wholly determined by the moral law; an evil will 
as such is one none of whose maxims are universalizable, 
and which is therefore not determined by the moral law at 
all but wholly by inclination. A maxim is moral just in 
case it can be a universal rule. 
II.2. Kant would therefore no doubt agree that 
if it could be shown that no maxim can be a universal rule 
then either there can be no moral maxims or moral maxims 
need not be universalizable. Such a demonstration would 
also show that universalizability of maxims cannot be the 
supreme principle of morality. I assume that there are 
moral rules. 
A maxim not only describes a will but also an action 
(C, 60)1 a BUbject is what it does. It is this descrip-
tion which is to be tested for its universalizability. Any 
such description must be either of a class of identical or 
non-identical acts. If it describes identical actions, 
the maxim's range is merely those actions and no different 
actions, and hence only those subjects! it can never apply 
to a BUbject with another identity, i.e. who acts differ-
ently. If the maxim describes non-identical actions, it 
is not the maxim of this action that is being tested, but 
only one of its components (Kant thinks its abstracted 
form), viz. that feature common to all actions of this 
type. If the entire maxim of this act is to be tested it 
is necessary to revert to the first alternative, viz. 
that it is only identical actions of identical subjects 
that are being examined. Either it is the maxim of this 
act which is being tested or it is not. If it is, the 
whole maxim must be tested and not only part of it (its 
form)» in which case, if it is universalizable it is so 
because it is identical in detail to all the actions of 
its type and in effect defines that class (in much the 
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way a description of 2 defines 2 in all its occuren-
ces). If it is not the entire maxim of this action 
v/hich is being tested, it is simply not a test of this 
action. The latter alternative defeats the purpose of 
the test, the former is not a test of the required type, 
viz. of the universalizäbility of the maxim over differ-
ent aotions. Even if Kant is right in his criticism of 
the indeterminacy of material principles, it looks as if 
his own highest moral principle has the same difficulty. 
A Kantian rejoinder to this reductib might be that 
the categorical imperative was never meant to be complete-
ly determinate for specific actions, that in fact, with 
respect to positive virtues at least, non-mechanical 
judgment (requiring understanding but not imagination 
(C, 69)) about means is required. Butt (1) this seems 
to amount to a denial that Kant's moral law is any more 
determinate than the Epicurean! (2) whatever means are 
considered to achieve some end, they will require formu-
lation in a maxim and testing against the categorical 
imperative to determine whether they are forbidden, which 
would make them susceptible to the maximal dilemmat (3) 
even if the categorical imperative dictates my own per-
fection and the happiness of others, it is the detail of 
involved characters which determines what can count as 
perfecting myself and whether others are worthy of the 
happiness I can give them, which detail, being unique to 
individuals, will in effect require more or less principle-
less judgment. 
II.3« The dilemma is not insurmountable. Its 
source is the demand for universality in moral principles 
and the consequent constrUal of universalizäbility as the 
moral law. Universality is only one part of moral law, 
and not its chief part. Aristotle begins his study of 
ethics with a similar disclaimer! the subject and basis 
of discussion "hold good only as a general rule, but not 
always"! a complete demonstration of the rightness of an 
act (or its wrongness) is out of the question! "the agent 
must consider on each different occasion what the situa-
tion demands" (E, 1094b, 1103b-1104a). Hence practical 
wisdom, in the sense of moral virtue (good character) and 
savoir-faire. .become constitutive and exhaustive of moral 
well-being (eupraxia). But practical wisdom can never 
attain the status of a science, for its subject matter is 
variable, and error is possible even on the highest level.. 
"The ultimate particular fact, of which there is perception 
but no scientific knowledge" is the sine qua non of moral-
ity (E, 1142a). He goes so far as to hold that moral 
truths must be confirmed by "the actual facts of life" 
(E, 1179a). Such truths would clearly count only as coun-
sels for Kant and not as laws (F, 416) and could never 
ground more than hypothetical imperatives. 
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1 1 . 4 . There is a relation of four ideas which 
is decisive for the differences between Kant and Aristotle 
pointed out in these first two sections. The relation is 
thist moral laws are (1) universal just in case they are 
(2) necessaryi they can be necessary just in case they can 
apply to (3) metaphysically free subjectsi and they can 
apply to such subjects just in case those subjects are 
(4) dis-unified. Kant accomodates the universality of 
law but his moral agents are dis-unified. Aristotle has 
the concept of a unified subject, but he denies the uni-
versality of moral law. It is for the sake of the meta-
physical freedom of the agent that Kant insists on univer-
sality, for he believes (rightly) that only free agents 
can be moral. Aristotle Bees the theoretical need for a 
concept of moral freedom, but he is able to provide one 
and maintain the unity of the subject as well, though he 
forsake8 universality and necessity into the bargain. 
Free You Are if You Think You Are 
III.l. The foundation of Kant's moral theory is 
the concept of freedom (C, 46 & F, 447) or autonomy. He 
defines freedom negatively as "independence from the de-
termining causes of the world of sense" (F, 452 & C, 29). 
"Autonomy of the will is that property of it by means of 
which it is a law to itself independently of any property 
of objects of volition", heteronomy results if the will 
"goes outside itself and seeks [its] law in the property 
of any of its objects" (F, 440-441). Autonomy is then 
identified as "the sole principle of all moral laws and 
of the duties conforming to them," while heteronomy "not 
only does not establish any obligations but is opposed to 
the principle of duty and to the morality of the will" 
(C, 53). It follows for Kant that the moral will must be 
determined prior to its apprehending any object of exper-
ience (C, 31, 57-58). In fact, he claims. r,the will is 
never determined directly by the object and our concep-
tion of iti rather, the will is a faculty which can make 
an object real" (C, 60). 
Juxtaposed with the concept of an object of experi-
ence as a member of a determined causal sequence, this 
concept of freedom gives rise to the problem of making the 
autonomous will intelligible as the cause of any temporal 
objeot, in this case an action. Free will cannot be cau-
sally determined and can therefore never be understood as 
part of such a sequence. But it is only as free that a 
will is moral. There is thus a logical hiatus between the 
moral will and its objects. Indeed, Kant insists that the 
objective reality of freedom "can never be comprehended or 
even imagined" (F, 459), that "freedom of an efficient 
cause cannot be comprehended" (C, 94). 
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Kant's resolution of this difficulty is to under-
stand the will and its objects as belonging to separate 
'worlds,1 one intelligible the other sensible (F, 451-
452), which can never, because they are logically dis-
tinct, give rise to the contradiction of the first Cri-
tique 's third antinomy. This resolution gives the 
negative concept of freedom as the will's independence 
from determination by empirical objects. But that is 
insufficient for morality1 what is required is a positive 
concept of the autonomous will as an efficient cause. 
This is provided by the autonomy expressed in the 
principle of morality and the "consciousness of freedom 
of the will" (C, 42). It is this consciousness of free-
dom and of determinability by nothing but the moral law 
that makes us moral agents and "transfers us into an in-
telligible order of things." The concept of practical 
reason is thereby transformed from its transcendent to 
its immanent significance (C, 16, 48), though not in a 
speculative but only in a practical way. 
What Kant has sacrificed for this concept of meta-
physical freedom is the unity of the moral agent and with 
it the possibility of understanding a moral personality 
as a cause of action, both of which he admits. There are, 
however, other consequences. For example, it is impossi-
ble to understand why evil could ever be imputed to a sub-
ject, since Kant agrees that a metaphysically free subject 
must have "the capacity (facultas) to overcome all oppo-
sing sensible impulses" (M, 397)« Indeed, if such strength 
of will is granted, weakness of will seems to be a mere 
illusion. 
III.2 Aristotle seems to have foreseen at least 
Borne of these difficulties and to have provided a concept 
of moral freedom (voluntariness) which is adequate for ex-
planation without sacrificing the unity of the moral agent. 
He agrees with Kant that heteronomy results in the nega-
tion of freedom (E, 1110a). But what counts as heteronomy 
is the subject's being physically constrained to behave in 
a certain way. He allows that there are mixed cases in 
which material circumstances combine with a subject's de-
sires and give rise to only partially autonomous behavior. 
The term voluntary is to be UBed "where the source of mo-
tion is within oneself, it is in one's power to act or 
not to act" (E, 1110a). Clearly what is meant by "within 
oneself" is 'within one's physical dimensions* and not 
merely 'within one's mind (reason).' 
It is however, not material constraint but the effect of inclination that is most decisive for Kant's placing the source of action in the subject's will (practical rea-
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son). The consequence of his doing so is that action 
caused by inclination is not free action. Aristotle sees 
the problemi "do we perform noble acts voluntarily and 
base acts involuntarily? The latter alternative is ridi-
culous, since the cause in both cases is one and the 
same...It is...wrong to call involuntary those acts which 
are due to passion and appetite" (E, 1111a). The reason 
for all this is that "the irrational emotions are con-
sidered no less a part of human beings than reasoning is" 
(E, 1111b). 
III.3. The moral problem of freedom is simply 
to discover how a subject can himself determine his action 
and be responsible for it, and therefore morally good or 
bad. Kant's resolution clearly does not solve this prob-
lem because the relation between the agent (moral person-
ality) and his action is ineffable due to the radical 
disunity within the person himself. Any solution to the 
problem of moral freedom which can ever be intelligible 
must maintain the unity of the human subject. What is 
required is that we understand reason (in Kant's sense) 
as just one among many dimensions of a common continuum 
and thereby close the hiatus between the form and matter 
of the subject. Moral subjects must be substantial cau-
ses to be both efficient causes of action and autonomous, 
i.e. to be subjects at all. 
Everything with substantial existence determines 
its own behavior to some degreet every event is partially 
the result of the nature of the thing of which the event 
is a determination. If reason iB the only formal proper-
ty of subjects, then, as Kant supposes, a subject is au-
tonomous just so far as his reason is the cause of his 
action. But reason is not the only formal property of 
subjects, nor can it bej for in that case they could not 
be agents at all, a fortiori they could not be subjects. 
What Kant thinks are material (empirical) determinates 
of action, viz. inclinations, are in fact formal proper-
ties of the character of subjects. In so far as actions 
are determined by any component of character, whether 
reason or inclination, they are autonomous actions. 
Moreover, choice, so far as it is free, is no more 
undetermined than any other variable in the concept of 
action. Choice is morally free just in case and just so 
far as it derives from the nature of the choosing subject. 
A subject whose choice is wholly determined by another is 
not free, but this is an impossible limiting case since 
the nature of the subject necessarily enters into the de-
termination of its action. If we are not to allow that 
the determination of action by the subject's nature is to 
count as its freedom, then we must say that nothing, nei-
ther temporal nor a-temporal, can ever be free. But if 
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we allow the freedom of a-temporal subjects because of 
their self-determination, for the same reason we must 
allow the freedom of temporal subjects. If freedom is 
just autonomy, everything that is a determinate thing is 
free to some degree because it is partially determined 
by what it is. It is not whether humans are free that 
can be questioned, but how free they are, and that var-
ies, as Aristotle says, "with reference to the moment of 
action" (E, 1110a). 
Moral strength.can be understood as a composite 
immanent capacity to withstand external influence without 
external determination! moral strength is nothing other 
than freedom and varies from subject to subject and time 
to time. Moral virtue is gounded in the same capacity. 
If a subject is determined only by his irrational incli-
nation (per Impossibile) irrespective of external influ-
ence, he is just as free as he is tf determined only by 
his reason (also per impossibile). The task of moral 
education is to make one's inclinations and one's reason, 
i.e. one's character, tend toward the good, not to elimi-
nate the effect of the existence of either. Good charac-
ter (moral virtue and practical wisdom) is both the source 
and the goal of moral action. The reason that the good 
for man is composite is not only (though importantly) that 
it must be completely satisfying for any man (see Plato's 
Philebus). but more importantly, that freedom must under-
pin morality and freedom requires the composite substan-
tial subject. 
What Purpose in This Veil of Tears? 
IV.l. Kant seems to agree that human beings are 
purposive creatures, but he often talks aB if they could 
act without purposes. Indeed, it is an inevitable and 
characteristic feature of his moral theory that rational 
beings (like objects of beauty in the third Critique) are 
in effect "purposive beings without purpose.15 He insists 
that all subjective (material = empirical) ends be elimi-
nated from the motive of action, that moral agents as such 
have no subjective incentives (F, 427). Since an end for 
action is still required, he locates this objective end 
in "rational nature," which is the only "end in itself" 
(F, 429). This identification of rationality as the end 
in itself provides the required mediation between the 
first and the second and third forms of the categorical 
imperative (F, 431). The moral law makes reference nei-
ther to any external purpose (F, 415) nor to any expected 
result of action (F, 402). Material ends can yield only 
hypothetical imperatives. The categorical imperative must 
determine the will prior to any empirical influence or any 
knowledge of an action's possibility (C, 18), "Pure reason 
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is of itself alone practical* without any admixture of 
any kind of empirical grounds of determination" (C, 91). 
When Kant talks about the relation of the will to action 
his point is again that moral judgment takes nothing from 
sensuous nature but the mere form of lawfulness, which is 
"no more...than pure reason can also think for itself" 
(C, 71). The typic of practical reason is just the dis-
embodied law of nature abstracted to the mere concept of 
law (C, 67-69). The state of moral health is "the mind 
at rest," free from pathological determination, 'apathy' 
in its etymological significance (M, 408-409). 
IV.2 Aristotle's position, again, is quite dif-
ferent and quite pedestrian compared to Kant's. The pro-
per end of moral action for Kant is clearly an a-temporal, 
non-spatial object, the pure will. Aristotle disagrees! 
"the good which we have been seeking is a human good and 
the happiness a human happiness" (E, 1102a). Happiness 
is an action of the soul, but "the end for which an ac-
tion is performed depends on the time at which it is done." 
Not only the end but the freedom of an action is rela-
tive to its temporal position (E, 1110a). What is to be 
done in a particular circumstance cannot be decided in 
advance but depends on sense perception of "the ultimate 
particular fact" (E, 1142a). This perception of spatial 
situations underpins practical wisdom which in turn is 
required for the practical syllogism ending in action 
(E, 1144a). Despite his denial that deliberation, the 
function of practical wiBdom, ever determines ends (E, 
1112b) he rightly points out that "practical wisdom issues 
commands 1 its end is to tell us what we ought to do and 
what we ought not to do" (E, 1143a). And the criterion 
for good deliberation is always success at achieving the 
ends which moral character provides (E, 1142b). 
IV.3. To have a purpose is to be conscious of 
a goal, an end of action. But it is always with respect 
to his own action that a specific subject can be said to 
have a purpose. This requires self-consciousness prior 
to having a purpose. The self-consciousness that grounds 
purpose is the consciousness of one's capacities, I.e. 
the range of possible actions. This amounts to an intui-
tion of one's own nature. But the nature of the moral 
subject is always composite, so that the self-consciousness 
underlying purpose reveals both rational capacity and in-
clinations, i.e., character. 
Though self-consciousness is necessary it is not 
sufficient to provide actual goals 1 it can provide only a 
range of possible goals. The second condition of pur-
posiveness is perception of an actual situation in which 
one of the possible actions provided by self-consciousness 
can become real. But this is not mere understanding of 
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an actuality, for the action proposed is a future event. 
It therefore requires imagination which places the sub-
ject (with respect to some of his recognized capacity) 
in relation to a situation, which he believes will exist. 
What might be called imaginative realism together 
with self-consciousness provide the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions of purposiveness. This fact implies 
that the having of purposes and therefore the having of 
moral purposes is relative to individuals in specific 
spatio-temporal relations. All of the myridad variables 
of character and situation are determinative for action 
because they are determinative for purpose. 
What this suggests is that there are in fact two 
syllogisms involved in action, both of which may be called 
'practical.' The first determines ends and the second 
determines means. The former begins with self-conscious 
knowledge of one's possibilities, includes an imaginative 
perception of an actual situation and concludes with some 
one of the possible goals as actual. The latter begins 
with this actual goal, includes a deliberation over con-
crete means, and concludes with some real action. In this 
way moral subjects deliberate about both ends and means, 
and as one consequence can be held responsible for the 
ends they have as well as the actions they perform (IS, 
III, 5)« What subjects can't deliberate about is their 
capacities and character as given prior to action. Char-
acter sets possible ends, deliberation makes them actual. 
The maxim of an action, for it to be the maxim of 
some specific action, must be descriptive of both the 
subject's purpose and his proposed means, for means are 
just proximate ends. The test whether the maxim can serve 
as a universal law is therefore the test of whether the 
action which it describes will contradict the purpose 
which it includes. The contradiction by which a maxim 
fails to pass the test of the categorical imperative is 
a contradiction in purposes and is consequently dependent 
on the real consequences of the action it describes. If 
acting on a maxim would make it impossible to have the 
real purpose described in it, it cannot be universalized. 
In this way even Kant's 'ought' depends on an 'is.' In 
this way it is shown that the concept of real purpose is 
prior to the concept of the moral law. 
It may now be asked whether there is some goal 
which is inherent in the idea of purposiveness. Self-
consciousness provides the idea of a subject as an inde-
pendent entity. The concept of an absolutely independent 
substance is the concept of a metaphysically free sub-
stance. But such a substance, to remain independent, 
must be absolutely alonei it cannot come into relation 
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with anything else without sacrificing its independence 
and therefore its freedom. Clearly then, an absolutely 
free being cannot be a purposive being. But on the other 
hand, a being with a real purpose is not completely de-
termined by I t s objecti for its object, as goal* is partly 
determined by it. In so far as it is a goal it is taken 
up as a project and thereby made a part of the subject's 
character. To have a real goal is to assimilate part of 
the world to oneself. By having a purpose a subject en-
forces its freedomt it creates I t s independence by struc-
turing the world after its own character. To deny that 
one is free is therefore to deny that one has goals* that 
one is a purposive being. Freedom is just purpose suc-
ceeding. 
But success is always the actualizing of a subject's 
capacities) so freedom is the process of making oneself 
real. We may call this process 'perfection,' and take it 
that the purpose prescribed by self-consciousness is sub-
jective perfection. This is the ground of the truth that 
all men seek the good, for it is clear that all self-
conscious subjects must seek what they take to be their 
own perfection. Moreover, individual perfection must 
comprise the actualization of character, intelligence and 
inclination, for these are the elements provided by self-
consciousness. Freedom is in this sense actualizing one's 
character. 
Perfect Is As Perfect Does 
V.l. Almost joyously Kant proclaims that "the 
thought of duty...is the supreme life-principle of all 
human morality" (C , 8 6 ) . "The highest worth which human 
beings can and should procure for themselves lies in in-
tentions and not in actions only" (C, 71)! the positive 
commands of the moral law are maxims and not actions (M, 
392). Freedom as independence from the laws of nature 
and obedience to the self-legislated moral law within is 
the source of all value and the dignity of moral agents 
from which are derived the three primary formulations of 
the categorical imperative (F, 435-436). The moral law 
itself is the fundamental object of respect and maxims 
are moral just so far as they agree with the moral law. 
Moral worth, he says, can never reside in the effects of 
actions, i.e. purposes, because merely contingent results 
of action cannot command respectj "the pre-eminent good 
can consist only in the conception of the law in itself... 
so far as this conception and not the hoped-for effect is 
the determining ground of the will (F, 339-401). There 
is a feeling of respect for the moral law "of a kind that 
no man has for any inclinations whatever" (C, 92). The 
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result of forming one's intentions out of respect for the 
moral law is identified as "contentment" to distinguish it 
from happiness (the agreeableness of one's subjective con-
dition) (C, 117). Contentment is just the consciousness 
of virtue and virtue is the worthiness to be happy (C, 110). 
But* he says, a good will is only the conditio sine 
qua non of morality 1 it is not the complete good, the re-
mainder of which comprises happiness (F, 396). The reason 
that happiness cannot be the supreme principle of morality 
is that happiness depends on a contingent subjective con-
dition of the subject, "in the desire for happiness it is 
not the form but only the material which is decisive" (C, 
25). All material practical principles depend on "the 
actual presence of an object" and hence "place the ground 
of the determination of the will in the lower faculty of 
desire" (C, 22). Consequently, the complete good is a 
synthesis of concepts none of which derive from experi-
ence! these concepts are worthiness to be happy and hap-
piness (C, 1 1 3 f ) . 
It is understandable then how Kant can come to the 
peculiar conclusion that human virtue is really "moral 
disposition in conflict" (C, 84 and M, 380) and that 
"inclinations are always burdensome to a rational being" 
(C, 118). The effect on feeling of consciousness of the 
moral law, "moral feeling" properly so-called, is "merely 
humiliation" (C, 78). Kant seems to see the life of vir-
tue as one of constant internal struggle between a moral 
personality proper and its material inclinations, which 
constitute its desire for happiness. But there.can be 
no duty to desire personal happiness because one cannot 
be constrained to want what one inherently does want 
(M, 386")• With respect to one's subjective condition, 
one's duty is not happiness but perfection 1 "doing one's 
duty and...attaining the completeness of one's moral end 
regarding himself"-(M. 446), I.e. the cultivation of one's 
capacities (or natural endowments) (M, 387)» The duty to 
perfect oneself includes the duty to train one's inclina-
tions so that they do not inhibit dutiful action (even 
though it is necessary to suppose a priori that respect 
for moral law is stronger than all these inclinations 
toward pleasure combined (M, 397, 408)). Nevertheless, 
the duty of perfecting oneself is for Kant derivative 
from the moral lawj the moral law cannot be this duty 
because the moral law must, he thinks, be necessary and 
this duty is dependent on prior contingent conditions. 
V . 2 . Aristotle agrees with Kant that good inten-tions are not the complete goodj what more is required, however, is virtuous actions, for only a life of virtuous activity is a morally good life (E, 1139b). But inten-tions for Aristotle are neither formed nor supplied by 
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reason, they are simply desires, what Kant calls inclina-
tions. For Aristotle but not for Kant, an object of de-
sire must be provided for there to be an intention} this 
is why for Kant the moral law is the only proper end of 
action. For Aristotle the major premise of the practical 
syllogism requires that intention be determined with re-
spect to some sensible objecti it is possible for a man 
to "fulfill his proper function only by way of practical 
wisdom and moral excellence or virtuei virtue makes us 
aim at the right target and practical wisdom makes us use 
the right means" (E, 1144a) and the good man (which is 
possible for Aristotle but impossible for Kant) chooses 
to act "for the sake of the acts themselves...it is virtue 
which makes our choice right" (E, 1144a). A good man is 
a man of character and intelligence, a man of moral virtue 
and practical wisdom, a man whose desires or inclinations 
are in harmony with the way the world is at each moment 
of his life. Aristotle would not know what it means to 
say desires must harmonize with reasonj rather, it is 
both which must harmonize with the worldi "in intellectual 
activity concerned with action, the good state is truth 
in harmony with correct desire" (1139a). This is the 
basis of the doctrine of the mean, which is meant to 
specify the most general characteristic of the morally 
good life. 
V . 3 . Human beings, and I suppose all conscious 
beings, are incapable of valuing anything higher than 
themselves. For value is only meaningful in correlation 
with purpose and purpose is consequent on apprehending 
one's own capacities in self-consciousness. The actual-
izing of one's subjective capacities is the ground of 
valuation and so of moral valuation! perfect subjects 
are the only unqualified goods! all other goods are de-
rivative. Respect is due to subjects only so far as they 
are perfect, i.e. just so far as they have actualized 
their real capacities! and just so far do they have dig-
nity and justified self-esteem. The fundamental moral 
imperative is therefore not to wish or intend or to de-
sire to be perfect, but to be perfect. 
But perfection is, as Kant says, relative to sub-
jective conditions. The imperative to be perfect iB 
therefore not a determinative imperative for any parti-
cular subject unless the contingent facts are supplied 
or acquired through intuition and self-consciousness. 
But then the imperative is itself supplied in the same 
way, for intuition and self-consciousness give rise to 
real purpose and that is just the motive to perfection. 
Values are thus various for various subjects and in var-
ious situations! what is common is the goal of perfection. 
As one lives there is a steady transvaluation of values, 
for which there can be no absolute scale, but which is 
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determined by the combinations of values resulting from 
the combinations of variable characteristics of both sub-
ject and environment. What is required above all in moral 
problems is consciousness of all these countless factors, 
most of which are in fact rarely known. The standard 
virtues and cases which fill casuistical texts are only 
crude isolations of a few of these combinations of char-
acteristics. A real science of morals would look rather 
like advanced chemistryi the ethics we have are merely 
alchemy by comparison. 
But perhaps this is too pessimistic, and for two 
reasons. First, ethics as here envisioned would overlap 
at all points with a completed psychologyj indeed ethics 
is just a part of psychology, for what is good for sub-
jects is the same as what is right for them to do. Sec-
ondly, the ethics of right, at any rate, has only to do 
with those elements of character and the world which can 
be brought into harmony with each other, for purposes are 
the sorts of things which demand hierarchical ordering and 
establishing such priorities is one with bringing the sub-
ject's character into harmony. 
No one can be absolutely perfect (that is just the 
concept of God), but anyone can perfect himself within 
the parameters actually obtaining. To perfect oneself :1s 
merely to mold oneself into a harmonious unity of actual-
izing capacities! it is not a static condition, so it 
cannot be merely intending what is right. Purposive 
beings are always in fluxt the values that are possible 
to them are therefore in process. Subjective perfection . 
requires consciousness of possibilities and limitations, 
from which flows the ordering of purposes, which consti-
tutes the rational principle of the good life. 
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